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Abstract
This study uses a sample of 194 banks from 15 EU countries and two-stage data envel-
opment analysis (DEA) to provide evidence on the impact of the European Banking
Authority (EBA)’s capital exercise on banks’ efficiency. In the first stage of the analysis,
we measure the efficiency by employing DEA. We then use Tobit regression to inves-
tigate the impact of the capital exercise on banks’ technical efficiency. We estimate
several specifications while controlling for bank-specific attributes and country-level
characteristics accounting for macroeconomic conditions, financial development and
market structure. The results indicate that EBA’s capital exercise came, as a shock
for the banks would be contributing towards making the banks more stable. It would
be preventing banks from excessive risk-taking activities. Furthermore, it would be
allowing the banks to withstand the financial distress and contributing in banks be-
coming less prone to the systemic risk. The study finds that the capital requirements
would be creating favourable economic conditions, which would be, affect the extent,
depth and quality of financial intermediation and banking services.
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1. Introduction
In October 2011 the European Banking Authority (EBA), the institution charged with
setting harmonized supervisory standards for banks in EU member states, announced that
Major European banking groups would have to increase their core tier 1 capital ratios to 9
percent of their risk-weighted assets by June 2012 (EBA, 2011b). These groups were also
required to hold a new temporary capital buffer to cover risks linked to sovereign bond
holdings. The announcement came largely as a surprise, as the EBA had just conducted
rigorous stress tests in the summer of 2011 and had already released detailed information on
the exposure of European banks to sovereign risk. This announcement came at a time when
the euro area was still considered to be extremely fragile, following a tumultuous summer
on the sovereign debt markets of several member states. Many observers were concerned
that impaired bank balance sheets were leading to weak credit supply and aggravating the
recession in several countries. Therefore, the timing of the EBA’s capital exercise came under
fire from the critics for contributing to a “credit crunch” in the euro area.
Indeed, any attempt to evaluate the impact of a capital requirement shock on lending supply
faces several challenges. First, new regulations, such as Basel I to III, have generally been
announced well ahead of their implementation explicitly in order to allow banks to smoothly
adjust their balance sheets. This makes the task of identifying an unexpected shock to capital
requirements and measuring the short-term impact on loan supply quite difficult. Second,
as with the 2007-09 sub-prime crisis, regulators may increase requirements on account of a
deterioration in the credit quality of borrowers during a downturn. Similarly to the difficulty
of measuring the impact of a bank capital shock more generally, disentangling demand and
supply effects is therefore not straightforward. Third, changes to bank regulations tend to
affect all large banks of a given country at the same time, making it difficult to construct
appropriate control groups of untreated but similar institutions.
Most of the recent studies have been focussing on how the Basel Accords would affect
the efficiency of the banks. Basel III have allowed banks to have a transition period before
the regulations are fully implemented (BIS, 2011). This would be allowing the banks to
have time to make necessary time to make the adjustments without affecting its efficiency.
However, the EBA capital exercise announcement came as a shock to the banking industry.
The EBA announced its capital exercise after drawing conclusions from its own June 2011
stress tests (EBA, 2011b) . This announcement required the banks to be holding 9% capi-
tal ratio by June 2012(EBA, 2011c) .The new required ratio was higher than that planned
under under the transition to Basel III and explicitly not related to the level of risks of any
particular banking group, but rather to ensure that all large European banks accumulated
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sufficient capital cushions to withstand a further deterioration in the sovereign debt crisis.
The horizon set by the EBA to meet the higher required was shorter compared to Basel III
process.This makes the case for the observed change in lending over the period was a result of
the capital requirement shock. All of these elements reflect that the Capital Exercise comes
close to a natural experiment and providing a rare opportunity to observe an exogenous
regulatory shock to bank capital.
Me´sonnier and Monks (2014) investigated the impact of of a regulatory shock tightening
bank capital requirements on lending to the real economy.The results show that the exercise
had pro-cyclical macroeconomic effects on credit supply. (Gropp, Mosk, Ongena, and Wix,
2018) showed that the Banks did not raise their capital ratios by increasing their levels of
capital, but by reducing their risk-weighted assets, in particular their credit exposures to
corporate and retail clients.Numerous researchers have shown the role of capital requirement
on the technical efficiency of the banks. However, none have looked into the role of such
capital shock on the technical efficiency of the banks.
This study attempts to fill in the gap by providing evidence on how the EBA’s capital shock
impacted on the efficiency of the banks. To do so, the study conducts an analysis of the
impact of the capital shock on the efficiency scores estimated by DEA. The study uses the
balance sheet data of the banks, macroeconomic conditions, financial development and mar-
ket structure to investigate impact on the bank efficiency while controlling for bank specific
factors. To my best knowledge, this is the first study to do so. The study uses a sample of
194 banks from 15 countries which is comprehensive in terms of geographical coverage. The
EBA’s capital exercise made the banks to reconsider their activities in the banking sector
and to manage their portfolios better. It has aimed to make the banking market less con-
centrated. The results show that the mean of the Technical Efficiency for the banks in the
sample equal .505 and .488 for before and after the capital exercise announcement was made
by the EBA respectively.Furthermore, the capital exercise contributed in stabilising the tech-
nical efficiency over the years. The EBA’s capital exercise has contributed towards making
the banks more stable and having less likelihood of having a financial distress. Additionally,
it would be preventing the banks from excessive risk-taking activities.As the exercise would
creating an environment for careful lending and better bank performances.
The rest of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the EBA
Capital Exercise and a review of studies that an investigated efficiency and capital require-
ment. Section 3 outlines Data Envelopment Analysis while Section 4 presents the sample
and variables used in the study. Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 concludes the
study.
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2. Literature Review
2.1. EBA Capital Exercise
On October 26,2011 The EBA announced its capital exercise which required banks to
strengthen their capital positions by by building up a temporary capital buffer against
sovereign debt exposures and to raise their core tier 1 capital ratio to 9% (EBA, 2011a).
The banks were required to meet these requirements by June 2012. The aim of the exercise
was to build confidence in the ability of euro-area banks to withstand credit shocks.
The level of the new required core-tier-1-to-RWA ratio was substantially higher than that
planned under the transition to Basel III (BIS, 2011). This was explicitly not related to
the level of risks of any particular banking group. As a result, it is fair to assume that the
heightened requirement came as a surprise for most of the banking groups involved (Gropp
et al., 2018). The new required ratio was higher than that planned under under the transition
to Basel III and explicitly not related to the level of risks of any particular banking group,
but rather to ensure that all large European banks accumulated sufficient capital cushions
to withstand a further deterioration in the sovereign debt crisis (EBA, 2011b). The horizon
set by the EBA to meet the higher required was shorter compared to Basel III process.This
makes the case for the observed change in lending over the period was a result of the capital
requirement shock. The EBA published an initial country-level estimate of required capital
raising on October 26, 2011. On December 8, 2011, it published a formal recommendation
with bank-level figures based on September 2011 balance sheet data (EBA, 2011c). Twenty-
seven banks were identified as having an aggregate capital shortfall of 76 billion and were
required as a consequence to submit capital plans to the EBA through their national su-
pervisory authorities by January 20, 2012. (EBA, 2011c)The EBA published a preliminary
assessment of the plan on February,2012 and emphasized that the measures were observed
not be having any negative impact on the lending into the real economy (EBA, 2011c). On
July 2012, the preliminary report was published and the majority of the banks had met
the capital requirements. The final report, including end-June 2012 detailed balance sheet
information for all participating banks was published on October 3,2012 (EBA, 2012).
Numerous researchers have criticized the timing of the capital exercise due to potentially ag-
gravating the credit crunch in the Euro area (Me´sonniera and Monksb, 2015). However, The
EBA has consistently emphasized for the need to address the capital shortfalls without con-
straining credit provision in the real economy. However, the EBA consistently emphasized
the need for banks to address capital shortfalls without constraining credit provision to the
real economy. For example, the recommendation of December 8, 2011 outlined a hierarchy
of capital-raising measures, emphasizing the use of liability management and stating that
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national authorities could only agree to asset disposals if they did not “lead to a reduced flow
of lending to the EU’s real economy” (EBA, 2011c) . Furthermore, the EBA and national
authorities were to ensure that capital targets were “not achieved through excessive delever-
aging, disrupting lending into the real economy” (EBA, 2011c). In total, the twenty-seven
banks increased their capital by 115.7 billion (EBA, 2012). According to the EBA’s final
report, 83.2 billion of this related to direct capital measures, while 32.5 billion related to the
impact of RWA measures (EBA, 2012). Contributing to the latter figure was a fall in RWAs
of 42.9 billion (0.87 percent of total RWAs as of September 2011) arising from reductions
in lending (EBA, 2012). The EBA concluded: “In line with the Recommendation, capital
plans have not led directly to a significant reduction of lending into the real economy. A
deleveraging process had already started before the capital exercise and will need to continue
in an orderly fashion” (EBA, 2012).
2.2. Efficiency and Capital Requirements
In banking, the capital structure is considered to be more significant than the other
industries because of informational failures, principal-agent issues, bankruptcy costs, taxes
and regulation. Capital acts as a buffer against loss, and hence failure with limited liability
(Wang, 2014). The proclivity for commercial banks to engage in high-risk activities is cur-
tailed when greater amounts of capital are at risk. Generally, it is expected that the capital
adequacy ratio to exhibit a positive relationship with a bank’s value(Wang, 2014).
Numerous researchers have found that a higher capital adequacy will be resulting in smaller
tax deduction or lower risk by having a higher proportion of equity to debt, which con-
tributes towards the higher risk-taking behaviour. By having a higher capital adequacy
ratio in place, it would be giving the depositors more confidence in a bank’s security and
forms a type of internal fund resource. Additionally, it has been seen that the large banks
tend to hold capital in excess of the most stringent regulatory requirements as a response
to perceived risk exposures and in some instances, with an aim of maintaining their future
profit streams(Chortareas, Girardone, and Ventouri, 2011). If the bank are required to have
the capital more, the upside gains they would be enjoying from the greater risk taking would
be countervailed by the potential downside loss of their capital. Therefore, it is significant
to align the capital adequacy regulations with the incentives of banks with depositors and
other creditors. This would be contributing towards more careful lending and a better bank
performance. However, this belief is based on the public interest view and tend to ignore
possible regulatory costs which would be in the form of high barrier to entry and greater
rent extraction by the governments that result from higher capital requirements.
4
Review of Economic Analysis forthcoming, 2020 (12)
If the regulator decides to put capital regulations in place, then this would be influencing
the following: - 1.The quantity and quality of lending made by the banks 2.The decision of
the banks when allocating their asset portfolios 3.The decision of the banks in relation to the
sources of their funds. As a result of these factors, the capital regulations would be affecting
the efficiency of the banks. The capital regulations specifies the amount of capital which a
bank must have at risk. If the bank is required to be holding more capital at risk, then the
gains made from the high risk-taking would countervailed by the potential downside loss of
their capital. Barth, Lin, Ma, Seade, and Song (2013b) found that the capital adequacy reg-
ulations have a significant role in relation to the incentives of the bank with depositors and
other creditors. This would be contributes in more careful lending practice and better bank
performance. The capital regulations influences the decision of the banks regarding the mix
of deposits and equity. The deposits and equity bears different costs for the bank. VanHoose
(2007) investigated the effects of the capital regulations on the banks. He found that by
having stricter capital regulations in place , the efficiency of the banks would be improving
only if the regulatory screening ability is low. Additionally, if the regulatory screening ability
is high, the efficiency would improve if there is loose capital regulations. When the capital
regulations are placed, the banks are looking to substitute the loans with alternative forms
of assets. The banks are looking to for different asset portfolios which would be generating
better returns and requires the different resources to be managed. Therefore, the capital
regulations raises questions about the bank’s management of its portfolio of different assets
efficiently.
Barth et al. (2013b) investigated the efficiency of the banks in 72 countries for the period
1999 to 2007 using the worldwide surveys on bank regulation. When using DEA, they found
that the tighter regulations on the banking activities have a negative impact on the bank
efficiency. While greater capital restrictions are marginally and positively associated with
the bank efficiency. There findings imply that there are potential trade-offs between bank
soundness and efficiency. This means that the stricter capital regulations has weak rela-
tionship with the bank efficiency. The stricter capital regulations would be contributing
in reducing the bank risk, but not be a highly significant benefit for the efficiency gains.
Pasiouras, Tanna, and Zopounidis (2009)investigated the impact of the banking regulations
on bank’s cost and profit efficiency for banks operating in 74 countries during the period
2000-2004. They found that the stricter capital requirements would be improving the cost
efficiency while reducing the profit efficiency. This would explained by having a stricter
capital requirements, the likelihood of financial distress would be reduced , while the lower
profit efficiency could be explained by the bank’s balance sheet getting more inclined towards
liquid, lower return assets.
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Moral hazard could defined as excessive risk-taking when another party is bearing part of
the risk and could not be charged easily for or prevented from that risk taking. Most of
the empirical research have found that the high capital ratios would be preventing moral
hazard from taking place between shareholders and managers. This contributes towards in
improving the efficiency of the banks. These research have investigated the conflicts between
shareholders and managers. Usually they support the notion that both efficiency and capi-
tal are relevant determinants of a bank’s risk taking and more hazard incentives.Berger and
DeYoung (1997)found that the banks with less capital would be responding to the moral
hazard incentives by taking higher portfolio risks. As a result, there would be a decrease
in the capital ratios of the banks before the increase in non-performing loans for the banks
with low capital ratios. This would be causing a decline in the efficiency levels of the banks.
Barth, Caprio Jr, and Levine (2013a) found the relationship between the capital regulations
and non-performing loans. There are less non-performing loans when rigorous capital regu-
lations are in place.
Pasiouras, Gaganis, and Zopounidis (2006) used the country level data and bank level data
from 71 countries and 857 banks to investigate the impact of bank regulations, supervision,
market structure, and bank characteristics on individual bank ratings. Pasiouras (2008a)
using DEA investigated the Greek commercial banks for the Greek commercial banks over
the period 2000-2004. He found that there is a positive relationship between the capital
requirements and technical efficiency. However, this is not statistically significant in the
different combinations of inputs and outputs used in the DEA model. Defung, Salim, and
Bloch (2016) investigated the technical efficiency of the banks in Indonesia for the period
1993-2011 by employing DEA. They found that the strengthening of the banking system
with higher capital to asset ratios, higher minimum reserve requirements and enhanced su-
pervision led to lower efficiency in the intermediation approach. However, these reforms
have led to an increase in revenue efficiency.Santos (1999) used an intermediation model to
study the efficiency and welfare implications of the banks’ minimum required capital–asset
ratio. The results showed that a bank’s stability and efficiency would be improving if there
is capital regulations in place. Chiu, Jan, Shen, and Wang (2008) investigated the efficiency
of Taiwan banks for three-year period from 2000 to 2002 using DEA. They found that the
average efficiency scores of banks with high capital adequacy are significantly higher than
those of banks with lower capital adequacy. However, the period for their research is con-
sidered to be very less for making any conclusions.
By controlling for bank specific , industry specific and macroeconomic variables, which are
supposed to influence the efficiency , capital and risk relationship, Tan and Floros (2013)
examined the relationship between efficiency , risk and capital in the Chinese banking indus-
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try. They found that bigger banks (in terms of total assets) have higher technical efficiency.
Furthermore, in a higher concentrated banking market, the technical efficiencies of Chinese
banks are lower. Also, they found GDP growth rates have positive impact on the efficiency.
Wheelock and Wilson (1995) using the micro-level historical data to examine the causes
of bank failure. The results indicate that increasing inefficiency increases the probability
of bank failure. The probability of failure would be higher for a bank which was less effi-
cient at transforming labour , capital and financial inputs into earning assets and demand
deposits.The lower a bank’s capital/assets or cash/deposits ratios, the more likely it was
to fail.Fa¨re, Grosskopf, and Weber (2004)investigated the effect of the regulatory constraint
such as risk-based capital constraint and leverage constraint on the efficiency. Using a sample
of banks from 1990,1992 and 1994 Call Reports,they found that the relaxing the regulatory
constraints leads to greater technical inefficiency. The results showed the significance of the
regulatory constraints on the technical inefficiency.
Bitar, Saad, and Benlemlih (2016) investigated the impact of capital ratios on risk, efficiency
and profitability in the Middle East and North Africa region using risk-based regulatory ra-
tios and non-risk-based traditional capital ratios for the period 1999 to 2013. They found
that the banks with higher capital ratios have higher loan loss reserves and are more effi-
cient. They found that higher proportions of net loans in bank total assets improves the
bank efficiency . Bitar, Pukthuanthong, and Walker (2018)analysed the impact of the cap-
ital on risk, efficiency, and profitability of banks in 39 OECD countries during the period
1999-2013.They found that risk-based and non-risk based capital ratios increases bank effi-
ciency. Their findings show that requiring highly liquid banks to hold higher capital may
hinder their efficiency. The asset growth is positively associated with bank efficiency. Their
results show bank size to have a positive relation with bank efficiency. This suggests that
larger banks benefit from economies of scale. Additionally, they found that GDP growth is
positively correlated with bank efficiency. The banks in countries with higher GDP growth
are more efficient and more profitable. These banks tend to hold smaller loan loss reserves
reflects favourable economic conditions. These studies show the significance of the bank
specific, industry specific and macroeconomic variables on the bank efficiency.
3. Methodology and Data
3.1. Data Envelopment Analysis
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) has been widely used in the measuring the efficiency
in the banks. DEA is a linear program in the form of piecewise linear combination which
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presents a set of best practice observation and evaluates the performance by relating the
input and outputs relating to the common efficiency frontier (Xu, Gan, and Hu, 2015) .
DEA measures the relative efficiency in situations in which there are multiple inputs and
outputs and there is no obvious objective way to aggregate either inputs or outputs into a
meaningful index of productive efficiency(Holod and Lewis, 2011). In its basic form, considers
a collection of decision-making units (DMU) each of which consumes DMU-specific levels of
selected inputs to produce DMU-specific levels of selected outputs(Holod and Lewis, 2011).
DEA makes no assumptions regarding the manner in which a DMU converts inputs into
outputs. DEA establishes an efficiency frontier based on observed best performances and
evaluates the efficiency of each DMU relative to this frontier. DMU that lie on the frontier
is considered as efficient. When apply DEA in evaluating the performances of a set of banks,
it is possible to form two groups such as one that comprise an efficient frontier and the other
with the banks lying below the frontier (Titko, Stankevicˇiene˙, and La¯ce, 2014). When DEA
is applied, the efficiency scored is estimated as the ratio of weighted outputs to weighted
inputs (Titko et al., 2014). The weights are selected for each variable of every analysed unit
in order to maximize its efficiency score. Each DMU is assigned an efficiency score which
ranges between 0 and 1. The score equal to 1 indicates an efficient DMU with respect to
the rest DMUs in the sample. The first version of DEA assumes constant returns to scales
(CRS) which means that a change in the inputs is followed by a change in same proportion
of the outputs (Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes, 1978). The output of this model is a score
indicating the overall technical efficiency (OTE) of each DMU under CRS. In more technical
terms, let us assume that there is data on K inputs and M outputs on each of N DMUs. For
the ith DMU, these are represented by the vectors xi and yi respectively. The K x N input
matrix , X , and the M x N output matrix , Y , represent the data for all N DMUs. The
input oriented measure of a particular DMU , under CRS , is calculated as
Minθ, λθ (1)
s.t.− yi + Y λ ≥ 0 (2)
θxi −Xλ ≥ 0 (3)
λ ≥ 0 (4)
where θ ≥ 1 is the scalar efficient score and λ is N x 1 vector of constants. If θ = 1 the
bank is efficient as it lies on the frontier, whereas if θ < 1 the bank is inefficient and needs a
1 - θ reduction in the inputs levels to reach the frontier. The linear programming is solved N
times, once for each DMU in sample, and a value of is obtained for each DMU representing
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its efficiency score.
The choice of a model specification has a significant impact on the results of the research.It
is well known that the DEA is sensitive to the variable selection. When selecting the model’s
variables, statistically rigorous methods should be applied. The choice of number of variables
selected is significant because the greater numbers of variables a DEA model has, the more
efficient DMUs will be (Jenkins and Anderson, 2003). Therefore, it contributes in increase the
number of the efficient banks. Additionally, the application of the DEA should be done with
cautious and the factors such as country specific and industry-specific should be taken into
consideration (Pasiouras, 2008b). For ensuring the validity of the DEA model specification,
an isotonicity test should be conducted. An insotonicity test involves the calculation of
all the inter-correlations between inputs and outputs for identifying whether increasing the
amounts of inputs lead to greater outputs (Tsolas and Charles, 2015). If the inter-correlation
between inputs and outputs is observed positive, the insotonicity test is passed. Therefore,
the inclusion of inputs and outputs is justified.
In the following years, Banker, Charnes et al. (1984) employed a DEA model with variable
returns to scale (VRS). This means VRS relaxes the constant returns to scale assumption
and allows for the possibility that the bank’s production technology might exhibit increas-
ing, constant or decreasing returns to scale. This model decomposes OTE into a product of
two component. The first is the technical efficiency under VRS or pure technical efficiency
(PTE). This relates to the ability of the managers to utilize firm’s given resources. The
second is scale efficiency (SE). This relates to exploiting scale of economies by operating at a
point where the production frontier exhibits CRS. The CRS linear programming is modified
to consider VRS by adding the convexity by N1’ = 1, where N1 is a N 1 vector of ones. The
technical efficiency scores obtained under VRS are higher than or equal to those obtained
under CRS and SE could be obtained by dividing OTE with PTE. The VRS efficiency scores
are higher or equal to the CRS efficiency scores because of the scale size of each DMUs.The
present study would be reporting the efficiency estimates obtained under CRS. The efficiency
scores obtained under CRS have been used by many earlier studies (Pasiouras, 2008a; Drake
and Hall, 2003). The CRS assumption allows comparing large banks with smaller ones.
DEA has been used for measuring the efficiency at level of bank branch , at country level
and at multi-country level. Schaffnit, Rosen, and Paradi (1997) investigated the efficiency
of Ontario based branches of a large Canadian bank. The results indicated that he most
efficient branches tend to be more profitable and deliver better quality service. They found a
strong effect of branch’s neighbourhood density on its performance. The efficiency at level of
bank branch is useful for the bank management to improve their service quality and utilize
the available resources more efficiently (Paradi and Zhu, 2013). The efficiency at country
9
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Inputs Outputs
1.Total Deposits 1.Loans
2.Total Costs 2.Other Earning Assets
2.1. Interest Expenses
2.2. Non-Interest Expenses
3.Equity 3.Non-Interest Income
Table 1: Description of Inputs and Outputs for DEA.
level is important for the development of financial regulation and for financial regulators
(Staub, e Souza, and Tabak, 2010). Jemric and Vujcic (2002) investigated the efficiency of
Croatia banks.They found that the decision of the regulators to privatize and for the entry of
foreign banks was correct decision. This contributed in an increase in efficiency and improv-
ing the operation of the market participants. Pasiouras (2008b) investigated the impact of
regulations and supervision on banks technical efficiency using a sample of 715 banks from
95 countries. This analysis provides a comprehensive analysis of relationship between bank
efficiency and regulation and supervision approaches around the world. The cross-country
analysis provides an international evidence.Therefore, this study adopts a cross-country ap-
proach to provide an international evidence for the role of EBA’s capital exercise on the
technical efficiency.
For measuring the bank efficiency, the input-oriented DEA models are most frequently
used. The possible reason is that the bank managers have higher control over inputs rather
than over outputs (Fethi, Pasiouras 2010). The input-oriented DEA model objects to max-
imize the proportional reduction in inputs as much as possible so as to achieve relative
efficiency, given the same output level .The input oriented model’s target is to minimize the
inputs while adequately satisfying the given output level. The input-oriented DEA model
allows to reduce inputs without changing outputs to achieve efficiency. These inputs reduc-
tion or savings are defined as input slacks. The input slacks can be seen as an important
indicator to help bank managers to improve their banks’ performances.
3.2. Data and Variables
The focus is on the commercial banks because it would allow us to examine a more homo-
geneous sample in terms of services and consequently inputs and outputs enhancing further
the comparability among counties. The sample consists of the banks in 15 countries in Eu-
rope with the financial data available from Market Intelligence for the period 2008-2015.
The banks were excluded from the sample for one of the following reasons: - (i) they had no
data available for any of the years, (ii) they had missing or negative values for the required
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inputs/outputs, and (iii) they had missing values for the bank- specific control variables. The
final sample consists of 194 banks in 15 countries in Europe. This is followed by splitting
the sample into 2 sub-samples based on the announcement of the Capital Exercise. The
first sub-sample is before the announcement is made and for the period 2008-2011. The sec-
ond sub-sample is after the announcement and for the period 2012-2015. During the above
procedure, we select the consolidated data only. The reports prepared under International
Financial Reporting Standards are used where available, but if only reports prepared under
local generally accepted accounting principles are available, then it is used. All the data was
converted to Euro prior to downloading, using official exchange rates available in Market
Intelligence. The country specific variable is downloaded from the World Bank.
There is an on-going debate in the banking literature relative to the proper definition of input
and output. Berger and Humphrey (1997) identified two main approaches for the selection of
inputs and outputs. These are the ‘production approach ‘and the ‘intermediation approach’.
The production approach assumes that the banks produce loans and deposits account ser-
vices by using labour and capital as inputs, and that the number and type of transactions
measure the outputs. The intermediation approach perceives the banks as financial inter-
mediaries between savers and investors. Berger and Humphrey (1997) argues that neither of
these two approaches are perfect because they cannot fully capture the dual role of financial
institutions as providers of transactions and also being financial intermediaries. Moreover,
they point out that the production approach is better for evaluating the efficiencies of bank
branches and the intermediation approach is more appropriate for evaluating financial insti-
tutions as a whole. For production approach, there are difficulties in collecting the detailed
transaction flow information. Therefore, the intermediation approach is more preferred in
the literature.
Recently, Drake, Hall, and Simper (2006) proposed a ‘profit oriented approach’. This ap-
proach defines revenue components as outputs and cost components as inputs. They point
out that their results are suited to capture the diversity of strategic responses by financial
firms in the face of dynamic changes in competitive and environmental conditions. Gener-
ally, inputs are those which are desirable to be minimal and outputs are those which are
desired to be maximized. In DEA, both input orientation and output orientation could be
used for solving the problem. In input oriented model, the inputs are minimized whereas in
the output oriented model, the outputs are maximized.
The review of the cross-country studies indicates that the intermediation approach is most
commonly used. This is consistent with the modern empirical literature of studies which ex-
amines individual countries. Following these studies, the intermediation approach is adopted.
The model is estimated using 3 inputs and 3 outputs. The inputs are total deposits, total
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costs which consists of interest expenses and non-interest expenses and equity. For maxi-
mizing profits, the minimazation of total cost is needed (Casu and Molyneux, 2003). Con-
sequently, total cost is used. Equity is used to control for the differences in risk preferences
(Pasiouras, 2008a) (Drake and Hall, 2003). The outputs are loans, other earning assets and
non-interest income. In the study ,Total Loans produced by the bank is used as an out-
put because this activity is highly resource consuming, with substantial value added (Berg,
Førsund, Hjalmarsson, and Suominen, 1993). Numerous studies have used non-interest in-
come as a proxy for off-balance sheet activities (Pasiouras, 2008).
3.3. Tobit Regression Analysis
Numerous studies which have suggested ways in which environmental variables could be
accommodated in DEA analysis. The environmental variables are described as the factors
which could influence the efficiency of the bank. In this case, such factors are not the tradi-
tional inputs and are assumed to be outside the control of the manager (Sufian, 2009). The
DEA scores falls between 0 and 1 making the dependent variable a limited dependent vari-
able.Ordinary Least Squares(OLS) ,Maximum Likelihood estimation(MLE) and Tobit model
could be employed for the second-stage analysis. Banker and Natarajan (2008) showed that
OLS ,MLE and Tobit model in the second stage significantly outperform the parametric
methods.The previous studies which have investigate the bank efficiency, have used the
Tobit model. This is because it could handle the characteristics of efficiency measures.
Therefore, providing the results which could provide important policy guidelines to improve
performance. Accordingly, DEA scores obtained in the first stage is used as a dependent
variable in the second stage and are regressed against bank characteristics, macroeconomic
conditions, financial development and market structure. The standard Tobit model can be
defined as follows for observation (bank) i:
y∗i = β
′
xi + i; ify
∗
i≥0andyi = 0, Otherwise(5)
where i ∼ N(0, σ2), xi and β are vectors of explanatory variables and unknown parameters,
respectively, while y∗i is a latent variable and yi is the DEA efficiency score.
In this study, the bank characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, financial development and
market structure would be used.
y∗it = β0 + β1LOGTAit + β2EQASSit + β3NPLit + β4ROEit + β5LOANTAit + it(6)
where y∗it is the technical efficiency of the ith bank obtained in period t.The first model would
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be using bank characteristics. The bank specific variables are: LOGTA is the logarithm of
bank’s assets and controls for bank’s size; NPL is loan loss provisions over total loans and is
a measure of Asset Quality; ROE is the pre-tax profit divided by equity; EQASS is equity
to assets ratios and is measure for the capital strength of the bank and LOANTA is total
loans over total assets and is a measure of loan activity. These variable have been used in the
past studies to reveal the bank specific characteristics which have an impact on the efficiency
(Pasiouras, 2008b; Pasiouras et al., 2006).
y∗it = β0+β1LOGTAit+β2EQASSit+β3NPLit+β4ROEit+β5LOANTAit+β6GDPGRit+it
(7)
where y∗it is the technical efficiency of the ith bank obtained in period t. The second model
would be using bank characteristics and macroeconomic conditions. Earlier studies have used
different variables for controlling the macroeconomic conditions. In this study, for annual
growth in GDP is used for controlling the macroeconomic condition. Earlier studies have
found that the favourable conditions would be affecting positively the demand of supply
of banking services and would possibly contribute towards an improvement in the bank’s
efficiency.Maudos, Pastor, Perez, and Quesada (2002) found that the banks operating in
expanding markets proxy by the real growth rate of GDP present higher levels of profit
efficiency. However, under expansive demand conditions, banks would feel less pressurised
to control their costs and could be less cost efficient.
y∗it = β0 + β1LOGTAit + β2EQASSit + β3NPLit + β4ROEit + β5LOANTAit
+ β6ASSGDPit + β7CLAIMSit + it
(8)
where y∗it is the technical efficiency of the ith bank obtained in period t.The third model
would be incorporating both bank characteristics and financial development. Numerous
studies have found that overall financial development, measured by banking market size and
levels of monetarization contributes to higher efficiency. In this study, these two variables are
used for controlling for the development of the financial sector. These measures have been
used in the studies of Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) ,Pasiouras (2008b) and Caprio,
Barth, Levine, et al. (2008). The banking market size is calculated by dividing Assets of
deposit money banks with GDP. The monetarization is calculated by dividing Bank claims
13
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to the private sector with GDP.
y∗it = β0+β1LOGTAit+β2EQASSit+β3NPLit+β4ROEit+β5LOANTAit+β6CONCit+it
(9)
where y∗it is the technical efficiency of the ith bank obtained in period t. Model 4 would be in-
cluding bank characteristics and market structure. T The study also controls for differences
in the market structure among countries. This is done by using the degree of concentration.
Earlier studies have found that less concentrated markets have a higher efficiency. This mea-
sure has been used in the studies of Pasiouras (2008b) and Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Levine
(2006). This is measured as the percentage of assets held by the three largest commercial
banks in the country.
y∗it = β0 + β1LOGTAit + β2EQASSit + β3NPLit + +β4ROEit + β5LOANTAit + β6GDPGRit
+ β7ASSGDPit + β8CLAIMSit + β9CONCit + it
(10)
Model 5 would be incorporating bank characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, financial
development and market structure.
This model would be incorporating bank characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, fi-
nancial development and market structure.
4. Results
4.1. Descriptive Statistics
rotating Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the inputs and outputs. From 2008 to
2015, the deposits and the equity are increasing. Both are increasing over the time. However,
the interest expenses and the non-interest expenses are both decreasing. But, the interest
expenses have decreased tremendously over the time while the non-interest expenses have
decreased but not as much as compared to the interest expenses. Loans and Non-interest
income have increased over the time. However, the other earning assets have decreased from
2008 to 2015.
Tables 4 and 5 shows the descriptive statistics for the bank characteristics, macroeconomic
conditions, financial development and market structure. From 2008 to 2015, EQASS which
measures capital strength has increased. Moreover, ROE has increased tremendously over
time which shows that profitability of the bank. However, NPL, LOANTA and LOGTA have
14
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Variable Description Remarks
Bank Characteristics
LOGTA Logarithm of total assets Size
NPL Loan loss provisions over total loans Asset Quality
ROE pre-tax profit divided by equity Profitability
EQASS equity to assets Capital Strength
LOANTA Total loans over total assets Loan Activity
Macroeconomic Conditions
GDPGR Real GDP growth Overall eco-
nomic condition
Financial Development
ASSGDP Assets of deposit money banks/GDP Size of the bank-
ing system
CLAIMS Bank claims to the private sector/GDP Activity in the
banking sector
Market Structure
CONC Percentage of assets held by the three
largest commercial banks in the country
Concentration
Table 2: Description of variables used in the regression model
diminished from 2008 to 2015. ASSGDP has diminished from 2008 to 2015. Additionally,
CONC has increased slightly from 2008 to 2015. The financial development variables have
negligible change from 2008 to 2015.
4.2. First Stage DEA Results
The observations for each specific bank , for each country and year are pooled together
in two samples :- 2008-2011 and 2012-2015. This is followed by running two DEA models ,
one for each sample. Each sample consists of 194 banks for each year. In total, each sample
has 776 banks. The minimum number of the banks each country in the sample for each year
is 4 and the maximum number for each year is 33. Table 6 and 7 presents the results of the
DEA under constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns to scale(VRS) respectively.
The panel in table 6 and 7 shows the average Technical Efficiency scores of the banks that
are experiencing constant returns to scale and variable returns to scale. Under CRS, The
mean of the Technical Efficiency for the banks in the sample equal .505 and .488 for before
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VARIABLE MEAN S.D. MIN MAX
LOGTA 16.28 2.623 10.28 21.53
EQASS 0.079 0.090 -0.305 0.976
NPL 7.725 8.455 0.821 37.81
LOANTA 0.647 0.192 0.000 0.889
ROE -13.70 220.9 -2956.6 41.15
GDPGR 1.826 1.719 -0.356 9.512
ASSGDP 88.75 48.97 47.02 380.3
CLAIMS 110.2 34.81 51.36 247.9
CONC 65.26 13.11 34.70 90.79
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for the control variables before 2011
VARIABLE MEAN S.D. MIN MAX
LOGTA 15.83 2.720 10.43 21.58
EQASS 0.087 0.043 -0.019 0.272
NPL 7.616 8.117 0.82 37.81
LOANTA 1.453 0.212 1.17 1.845
ROE 0.628 0.186 0.036 0.921
GDPGR 2.880 22.80 -162.2 185.7
ASSGDP 88.57 47.28 53.42 380.3
CONC 110.2 34.05 51.36 247.9
CONC 65.95 12.96 34.70 90.79
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for the control variables after 2011
and after the capital exercise announcement was made by the EBA respectively. Before the
announcement, the average bank could improve its technical efficiency by 49.48%. But, after
the announcement, the average bank could be improving its technical efficiency by 51.12%.
In other words, if the average bank was producing on the frontier instead of its current
location, only 50.52% of the inputs currently being used would be necessary to produce the
same output vector. However, after the announcement, only 48.88% of the inputs currently
being used would be necessary to produce the same output vector. Under VRS, The mean
of the Technical Efficiency for the banks in the sample equal .656 and .488 for before and
after the capital exercise announcement was made by the EBA respectively. Before the
exercise, the average bank could improve its technical efficiency by 34.41%. However, after
the exercise, the average bank could improve its technical efficiency by 41.65%. n other
words, if the average bank was producing on the frontier instead of its current location, only
34.41% of the inputs currently being used would be necessary to produce the same output
vector. However, after the announcement, only 41.65% of the inputs currently being used
would be necessary to produce the same output vector. Table 8 shows the Kolmogorov-
17
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COUNTRY Efficiency Score before Capi-
tal Exercise
Efficiency Score after Capital
Exercise
Austria 0.726 0.655
Belgium 0.557 0.836
Cyprus 0.448 0.463
Denmark 0.430 0.435
France 0.504 0.475
Germany 0.438 0.450
Italy 0.552 0.475
Luxembourg 0.555 0.444
Malta 0.563 0.632
Netherlands 0.653 0.513
Poland 0.671 0.614
Portugal 0.379 0.287
Slovakia 0.572 0.566
Spain 0.484 0.455
United Kingdom 0.426 0.488
Average 0.505 0.488
Table 6: DEA Results for banks under Constant Returns to Scale before the capital exercise
and after capital exercise.
Country Efficiency Score before Capi-
tal Exercise
Efficiency Score after Capital
Exercise
Austria 0.779 0.736
Belgium 0.974 1.000
Cyprus 0.490 0.505
Denmark 0.768 0.545
France 0.516 0.518
Germany 0.674 0.558
Italy 0.793 0.657
Luxembourg 0.640 0.518
Malta 0.461 0.441
Netherlands 0.632 0.668
Poland 0.429 0.454
Portugal 0.859 0.530
Slovakia 0.810 0.288
Spain 0.672 0.713
United Kingdom 0.901 0.813
Average 0.656 0.584
Table 7: DEA Results for banks under Variable Returns to Scale before the capital exercise
and after capital exercise.
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Group Efficiency P-Value
Before Capital Exercise 0 1.000
After Capital Exercise -0.495 0.023
Combined K-S: 0.495 0.046
Table 8: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test for DEA results under CRS
Smirnov Test DEA results under CRS before and after the capital exercise announce. The
efficiency of the banks before the capital exercise is larger than for the banks after capital
exercise.The largest difference between the distribution functions in this direction is 0.495.
The approximate p-value for this difference is 0.023. This shows that the difference between
efficiency after the capital exercise is highly significant at 5% level.
Under CRS, Before the Capital Exercise was announced, the most efficient countries
appeared to be Austria and Poland. After the Capital Exercise is announced, the most
efficient countries appeared to be Belgium and Austria. In general, the efficiency scores of
the banks have changed after the announcement of the capital exercise. The efficiency scores
of the banks in most of the countries have changed after the announcement. The efficiency
of the banks in most of the banks have declined. Only the efficiency of the banks in Belgium,
Germany, Malta, Denmark, Cyprus and the United Kingdom have improved. However, the
efficiency of the banks in Denmark after the announcement is negligible. The efficiency of
the banks in Portugal have the worst efficiency scores after the capital announcement. The
efficiency of the banks got worse because financial crisis in Portugal. The debt of Portugal
kept on rising. It was only in 2014, Portugal left EU bailout mechanism without requiring
any more support.
Under VRS, before the Capital Exercise, the most efficient countries appeared to be Belgium
and United Kingdom. After the the Capital Exercise, Belgium and United Kingdom still
remain to be most efficient. After the exercise,the efficiency scores of most of the banks
have changed. Most of the banks witnessed a decline in their efficiency scores. Only the
efficiency of the banks in Belgium, Spain, Cyprus, France ,Netherlands and Poland have
improved. After the capital exercise, the banks in Slovakia have the worst efficiency scores.
The us because of massive regional differences, high long-term unemployment and the lower
quality of the business environment and public administration.Also, the slowdown of many
big Eurozone economies likely had their impacts on the export-oriented Slovak economy.
Figure 1 shows the average efficiency of the banks under CRS and VRS from 2008 to
2015. The efficiency of the bank was increasing and decreasing till 2011. This could be
explained by the changes in the inputs and output over the years. The inputs such as
Interest Expenses and Non-Interest Expenses have been increasing and decreasing over time
19
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Fig. 1. - Efficiency of the banks in 15 EU countries over time under Constant Returns to
Scale and Variable Returns to Scale
Fig. 2. - Efficiency of the banks in 15 EU countries over time under Constant Returns to
Scale
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Scale of Returns P-value Null Hypothesis Rejected Null Hypothesis Level
CRS 0.05 FALSE 0.844
VRS 0.01 TRUE 0.936
Table 9: Returns to Scale Test for DEA models.
till 2011. The outputs are increasing and decreasing as well during this time. However, after
2011, the efficiency of the banks is decreasing till 2013. During this time, the inputs such
as Deposits and Costs are decreasing while the outputs such Loan and Other earning assets
are decreasing as well. However, the efficiency scores increase from 2013. The inputs such
as deposit, equity and interest expenses are increasing whereas the outputs such as Other
Earning Assets and Loans are increasing. The efficiency of the banks becomes steady from
2014 onwards. The changes in the inputs and the outputs while increasing and decreasing
are not drastic. The EBA capital exercise made the banks to reconsider their activities. As
a result, there was decrease in the efficiency of the banks which lasted till 2013. However,
after 2014, the efficiency of the banks has become steady which reflects the activity of the
bank is steady in terms of the inputs and outputs. But, this was not the case before the
2011 capital exercise announcement.
The Global Financial Crisis hit the Europe in 2008. The efficiency of the banks fell to
the lowest level during this time. In the following year, the efficiency of the banks started
improving. However, in 2010, the Sovereign Debt Crisis hits the Europe. This has resulted
in the efficiency of the banks to decrease again. After the capital exercise is announced,
the efficiency of the banks have fell down. This is because the banks have to restructure
their balance sheets and maintain the required targets which have been set by the EBA.
The efficiency of the banks continue to fall because of the crisis in Ireland. But, in the
following years, it starts to improve. This is helped by improvement in the stock market.
The EBA capital exercise requirements have helped the bans maintain their efficiency levels
in the following years. During these years, the Europe was once again on the brink of
recession. With Greece starting to cause panic. Furthermore, this was accompanied by
inflation falling to record low in the Eurozone and collapse of the oil price. The EBA capital
exercise requirements have contributed in allowing the banks to maintain their efficiency
levels during the years of turmoil. Additionally, the inputs and outputs of the banks became
steady because of the capital exercise.
In this study, CRS scores are used for conducting the Second stage analysis. Simar and
Wilson (2002)’s Returns to scale(RTS) test is performed. Table 12 shows the returns to
scale test for DEA models. The RTS test show that under CRS, the null hypothesis is not
rejected at 5% significance level. But, under VRS, the null hypothesis is rejected at 1%
21
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significance level.
4.3. Second-stage Analysis – Tobit Regression
In the second stage of the analysis, we investigate the determinants of the efficiency by
estimating an econometric model using the DEA efficiency scores as the dependent variable.
In the earlier studies, due to the limited nature of our efficiency measure that ranges between
0 and 1, this study uses a Tobit regression rather than OLS. F-test has been used in the
study for measuring the significance of the model. The p-value of F-test is less than 5% in
all the models. This shows the model is a better fit. Following Pasiouras et al. (2006) and
Pasiouras (2008b), QML (Huber/White) standard errors and covariates are calculated. This
is because heteroskedasticity can emerge when estimated parameters are used as dependent
variables in the second stage analysis.
4.3.1. Controlling for bank-specific characteristics
Tables 10 and 11 presents the regression results when controlling only for bank-specific
characteristics. The results provide with evidence in favour of the capital exercise used by
the EBA to promote the efficiency of the banks using the determinants of the efficiency.
Before the announcement, ROE is not having an impact on the inefficiency of the bank.
After the announcement, ROE is having a negatively significant impact on the efficiency of
the bank. This finding indicates that the more profitable banks have lower inefficiency. This
corroborates with similar findings of the other studies (Pastor, Perez, and Quesada, 1997;
Das and Ghosh, 2006). Banks which are reporting higher profitability ratios are usually
preferred by the clients. Therefore, they attract the biggest share of deposits along with
the best potential credit worthy borrowers. Moreover, this implies that the banks might
be having a higher ROE by either having a higher leverage (debt) or higher risk taking.
The capital exercise has aimed to reduce these activities of the banks. As a result, these
conditions create a favourable environment for the profitable banks to be more efficiency from
the point of view of their intermediation activities. Before and after the capital exercise, NPL
is having a highly negative significant impact on the inefficiency. This is consistent with the
earlier finding by among other, Kwan, Eisenbeis, et al. (1995); Resti (1997). These results
imply that the banks be focusing on the credit risk management which has been proven to
be problematic in the past. Serious banking problems have arisen from the failure of the
banks to recognize impaired assets and create reserves for writing off these assets. Before
the announcement, EQASS exhibits negative relationship with bank efficiency. The findings
imply that the more efficient banks, use less equity compared to its peers. The results seems
22
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Variables Model
1
Model
2
Model
3
Model
4
Model
5
BANK CHARACTERIS-
TICS
LOGTA -0.007 -0.007 -0.004 -0.008 -0.004
(1.92)* (1.92)* (1.00) (2.03)** (1.1)
EQASS -0.511 -0.504 -0.625 -0.651 -0.747
(1.85)* (1.85)* (1.92)* (2.19)** (2.29)**
LOANTA 0.009 0.051 0.035 0.004 0.071
(0.21) (1.11) (0.76) (0.09) (.54)
NPL -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(2.63)*** (2.18)** (3.06)*** (2.51)** (2.34)**
ROE 0.0008 0.0004 0.005 0.006 0.007
(1.61) (1.68)* (3.48)*** (2.24)** (4.68)***
MACROECONOMIC CON-
DITIONS
GDPGR 0.014 0.022
(2.28)** (3.47)***
FINANCIAL DEVELOP-
MENT
ASSGDP 0.0004 0.0002
(3.36)*** (0.58)
CLAIMS -0.001 -0.001
(5.01)*** (3.39)***
MARKET STRUCTURE
CONC -0.001 -0.001
(1.54) (1.27)
CONSTANT 0.665 0.606 0.709 0.759 0.765
(7.75)*** (7.27)*** (7.95)*** (7.79)*** (6.54)***
R2 0.043 0.066 0.150 0.050 0.202
LOGLIKELIHOOD 128.02 131.128 131.097 129.027 138.474
Table 10: Regression results before capital exercise. Model 1 controls for the bank charac-
teristics. Model 2 controls for bank characteristics and Macroeconomic Conditions. Model 3
controls for bank characteristics and financial development. Model 4 controls for bank char-
acteristics and Market structure. Model 5 controls for bank characteristics, macroeconomic
conditions, financial development and market structure. QML (Huber/White) standard
errors and covariates have been calculated to control for heteroscedacity (***statistically
significant at 1% level, **Statistically significant at 5% level, *Statistically significant at
10% level)
23
Review of Economic Analysis forthcoming, 2020 (12)
Variables Model
1
Model
2
Model
3
Model
4
Model
5
BANK CHARACTERIS-
TICS
LOGTA 0.001 0.003 0.013 0.001 -0.003
(0.18) (0.6) (2.30)** (0.08) (0.430)
EQASS 0.76 0.591 0.405 0.497 -0.248
(2.80)*** (2.14)** (1.19) (1.57) (0.63)
LOANTA -0.675 -0.596 -0.521 -0.652 -0.631
(8.28)*** (6.89)*** (7.09)*** (8.03)*** (7.00)***
NPL -0.003 -0.003 -0.0004 -0.003 -0.001
(3.22)*** (3.14)*** (0.34) (2.31)** (0.54)
ROE -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(1.72)* (2.11)** (2.17)** (2.32)** (3.25)***
MACROECONOMIC CON-
DITIONS
GDPGR 0.015 0.018
(2.81)*** (2.55)**
FINANCIAL DEVELOP-
MENT
ASSGDP 0.002 0.005
(3.39)*** (5.17)***
CLAIMS -0.001 0.003
(2.29)** (2.94)***
MARKET STRUCTURE
CONC -0.002 -0.012
(1.23) (4.98)***
CONSTANT 0.843 0.749 0.503 0.973 1.00
(7.67)*** (7.65)*** (3.73)*** (6.51)*** (5.27)***
R2 0.343 0.365 0.421 0.350 0.495
LOGLIKELIHOOD 88.74 91.94 92.80 89.78 104.9
Table 11: Regression results after capital exercise. Model 1 controls for the bank character-
istics. Model 2 controls for bank characteristics and Macroeconomic Conditions. Model 3
controls for bank characteristics and financial development. Model 4 controls for bank char-
acteristics and Market structure. Model 5 controls for bank characteristics, macroeconomic
conditions, financial development and market structure. QML (Huber/White) standard
errors and covariates have been calculated to control for heteroscedacity (***Statistically
significant at 1% level, **Statistically significant at 5% level, *Statistically significant at
10% level)
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to suggest that the less efficient banks could have been involved in riskier operations and in
the process tend to hold more equity, voluntarily or involuntarily, i.e., the reason might be
banks’ deliberate efforts to increase safety cushions and in turn decrease the cost of funds or
perhaps regulatory pressures that mandate riskier banks to carry more equity. However, after
EQASS has a significant positive impact on the efficiency. By having a higher capital, the
EBA has aimed in improving the confidence of depositors in bank’s security. Additionally,
it would be creating an environment for careful lending and better bank performances. It
would be reducing the likelihood of financial distress faced by the banks (Pasiouras et al.,
2009).LOANTA has a significantly negative impact on the technical efficiency of the bank.
This is in line with the findings of Havrylchyk (2006)who found a negative relationship
between LOANTA and efficiency. This ratio is considered as a proxy for Liquidity risk.
Therefore, the negative relationship could indicate that less efficient banks are also less
liquid. Before the capital exercise took place, EQASS and NPL have a negative correlation
with the Efficiency of the bank. A 1% increase in the bank efficiency would require the bank’s
EQASS to reduce by 1.95%.Similiarily, a 1% increase in the bank efficiency would require the
bank’s NPL to reduce by 5%.After the Capital Exercise, EQASS has a positive correlation
with the efficiency. This means that to increase the bank efficiency by 1%, the bank would
be required to improve EQASS by 1.31%. This reflects the significance of the contribution of
the capital strength towards the bank efficiency. Furthermore, a 3% decrease in NPL would
be contributing in 1% increase in the efficiency. LOANTA is having a negative impact after
the capital exercise on the bank efficiency. These results indicate that the capital exercise is
influencing the quantity and quality of lending made by the banks and the decision of the
banks when allocating their asset portfolios. Therefore, Capital Exercise would be affecting
the efficiency of the bank. These findings are in line with findings of Barth et al. (2013b) who
found that the capital regulations have a significant role to play in relation to the incentives of
the banks with depositors and other creditors. Additionally, the capital regulation would be
contributing towards having less non-performing loans. Moreover, the capital requirements
by the EBA would be reducing the likelihood of financial distress. As the balance sheet
of the bank is getting more inclined towards liquidity than lower return assets (Pasiouras
et al., 2009). The EBA announcement has contributed towards bank getting engaged in
more profitable activities. As a result, they would be able to attract the best potential
credit worthy borrowers who would be able to meet the obligations. This could be resulting
in banks having less loan loss. Moreover, these conditions would be creating an environment
for the banks to become more profitable and efficient.
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4.3.2. Controlling for Macroeconomic Conditions
Table 10 and 11 shows the regression results when controlling for the macroeconomic
conditions. The growth of the GDP in the model affects the other bank-specific variables.
Before the announcement of the capital exercise was made, GDPGR does have a signifi-
cant impact on the technical efficiency of the banks. However, after the capital exercise
announcement, GDPGR has a statistically significant impact on the technical efficiency.
This indicates that favourable economic conditions affect the extent, depth and quality of
financial intermediation and banking services. This contributes towards making the financial
institutions more efficient. Furthermore, by having a higher growth rate, it would be easier
for the debtors to meet their obligations. The other variables having significant impact on
the efficiency are EQASS, LOANTA ,NPL and ROE. Before the capital exercise, GDPGR
was positively correlated with the efficiency. This meant that to increase the bank efficiency
by 1%, the bank would be required to reduce GDPGR by .7%. After the Capital Exercise,
the magnitude of GDPGR is positive. This means that to increase the bank efficiency by
1%, the bank would be required to improve GDPGR by .6%. This reflects the significance of
the contribution of the real GDP growth towards the bank efficiency. After capital exercise,
there is a marginal decrease in the contribution of GDPGR towards the bank efficiency.
However, the results reflect that significance of favourable economic conditions towards the
banking activity (Chortareas et al., 2011). This would be making the bank become more
efficient.
4.3.3. Controlling for financial development
The regression results indicate that after controlling for the financial development for
before the capital announcement, CLAIMS and ASSGDP are having significant impact on
the efficiency. Both CLAIMS and ASSGDP continue to have a significant impact after the
capital exercise. The results show that both the activity in the market and size of the
market have an impact on the efficiency. CLAIMS has a negative impact while ASSGDP
has a positive impact on the efficiency. The capital regulations influences the decision of the
banks regarding the mix of deposits and equity. The deposits and equity bears different costs
for the bank. Furthermore, the capital requirements would be leading to careful lending and
better performance. The results indicate that the capital requirements would be reducing the
bank risk, but not be a highly significant benefit for the efficiency gains. When the capital
regulations are placed, the banks are looking to substitute the loans with alternative forms
of assets. The banks are looking to for different asset portfolios which would be generating
better returns and requires the different resources to be managed. Additionally, the capital
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requirement by the EBA would be preventing the banks for excessive risk-taking. It would
requiring the banks to for different asset portfolios which would be generating better returns
and requires the different resources to be managed. Furthermore, it would contributing
towards the banks having a decline in non-performing loans(Berger and DeYoung, 1997).
The EBA capital announcement has made the banks consider their activity in the banking
sector and to manage their portfolios. As a result, the banks would be having less likelihood
of having a financial distress.
4.3.4. Controlling for market structure
The results when controlling for the market structure are quite similar to the results
when controlling for the financial development. CONC does not have any significant impact
on the efficiency of the bank before and after the capital announcement. However, after
the announcement, LOANTA and NPL have a negatively significant impact while ROE has
a positive significant impact on the efficiency of the bank. Before the capital exercise, the
CONC was negatively correlated with efficiency of the bank. This meant that to increase
the bank efficiency by 1%, the bank would be required to reduce CONC by 10%. After the
Capital Exercise, CONC is still negatively correlated with efficiency of the bank. This means
that to increase the bank efficiency by 1%, the bank would be required to improve CONC by
5%. This reflects the contribution of the EBA capital exercise towards the efficiency of the
bank. Additionally, the less concentrated markets are associated with increase in efficiency.
4.3.5. Controlling for all the variables
When controlling for Bank characteristics, Macroeconomic conditions, Financial Devel-
opment and Market Structure, the results before the announcement are quite similar to the
results of controlling for market structure. However, the results changes after the announce-
ment. GDPGR, ASSGDP AND CLAIMS are statistically significant and positively related
to the technical efficiency of the bank. ROE is negatively significant to the technical effi-
ciency of the bank. However, LOANTA and CONC have significantly negative impact on
the efficiency of the bank. LOANTA is proxy for liquidity. If the bank is having a higher
loan to assets ratio, then it would be having less liquidity. Also, less concentrate markets are
associated with higher efficiency. The regression results indicate that CONC is statistically
significant and negatively related to technical efficiency. This shows that the less concen-
trated markets are associated with increased efficiency. This is consistent with the results of
(Pasiouras, 2008a). The high concentrated banking systems exhibit levels of systemic risk
potential higher than the less concentrated systems during the period 1993-2000, and this
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relationship was strengthened during the 1997-2003 period (Nicolo´, Bartholomew, Zaman,
and Zephirin, 2004).Pasiouras et al. (2006) reported a negative relationship between concen-
tration and bank’s overall performance and soundness as measured by Fitch ratings. Before
the capital exercise, the magnitude of EQASS was negative. This meant that to increase the
bank efficiency by 1%, the bank would be required to reduce EQASS by 1.33%. The bank
efficiency would be improved by 1% if the bank reduces NPL by 5%. GDPGR, CLAIMS and
CONC has economic significance on the efficiency of the bank. After the Capital Exercise,
the magnitude of EQASS is positive. But, it is not having economic significance on the
efficiency of the bank. LOANTA, NPL and CONC are negatively economic significant on
the efficiency of the bank while CLAIMS is a positively economic significant. The results
indicate that the capital exercise would be creating favourable economic conditions. The
banks would be becoming more involved in more careful lending. Additionally, the decision
of the banks would be influenced when allocating their asset portfolios. The banks would be
looking at different asset portfolios which would be generating better returns and requiring
the different resources to be managed. The capital regulation would be contributing in banks
having fewer non-performing loans. The results indicate that the capital exercise would be
preventing banks from moral hazard incentives. This is in line with the findings of Berger
and DeYoung (1997) who found that the banks with more capital would be involved in lower
portfolio risk taking. This shows higher capital requirements would be contributing towards
lower non-performing loans. This would be leading towards an increase in the efficiency of
the bank. The EBA’s capital announcement has aimed to make the banking market less
concentrated. This would be contributing in having banks less prone to potential systemic
risk. Furthermore, it would improving the overall performance of the banks and the sound-
ness of the banks The EBA announcement has contributed towards the banks increase their
efficiency by careful lending practices. This would be improving their overall performance
and prevent the banks from potential systemic risk.
5. Conclusion
This study employs data envelopment analysis and Tobit regression to examine the im-
pact of the EBA’s capital exercise on the bank’s technical efficiency. The sample consists of
194 commercials banks operating in 15 European countries from 2008-2015. The results of
the DEA indicate that the average bank in the sample could improve its technical efficiency
by 51.12%. But, before the announcement, it was 49.48%. The results indicate that the
capital exercise has led to a slight increase for the average bank in the sample for improving
its technical efficiency. After the capital exercise, the efficiency of the banks in the most
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countries have declined. The most efficient banks are in Belgium and the worst in Portugal.
In Denmark, the change of the efficiency of the banks is negligible. After the capital exercise,
the efficiency of the banks in 15 EU countries has become more stable. However, there is
high differences in the efficiency changes in the different countries such as Belgium.
Following the DEA results, Tobit model is used while controlling for the bank-specific charac-
teristics and country-level characteristics accounting for macroeconomic conditions, financial
development and market structure. The capital exercise announcement has led to change
in the bank-specific characteristics which determine the technical efficiency of the bank.
The study found that the profitability ,real GDP growth has a significant effect on the effi-
ciency of the bank. While controlling for the macroeconomic conditions, real GDP growth
have a positive significant impact on the technical efficiency of the bank. Also, the capital,
Non-performing loans, ROE and Loan Activity have a significant impact on the technical
efficiency. When controlling for the financial development, the activity in the banking sector
and banking market size have significant and positive relationship with the efficiency. While
Loan Activity and ROE has a negative impact. While controlling for the market structure,
LOANTA, ROE and NPL have a negatively significant impact on the efficiency of the bank.
Finally, when controlling for all the factors, GDP growth, activity in the market and the
market size are affecting the efficiency of the bank positively. However, LOANTA and CONC
have significantly negative impact on the efficiency of the bank. .
The empirical results suggests that the capital requirements not only strengthen financial
stability , but also make the technical efficiency of the banks more stable. The results will
be helpful for the EBA and the other regulators to make the relevant policies. The results
show the capital exercise would be preventing the banks from excessive risk-taking activities.
Furthermore, it would be allowing the banks to withstand the financial distress. Although,
the capital requirements would not be a highly significant benefit for the efficiency gains.
But, it would be creating favourable economic conditions which would be affect the extent,
depth and quality of financial intermediation and banking services. The paper highlights the
role of the capital exercise requirement on the technical efficiency of the banks and how the
bank characteristics and environmental variables play a role on the efficiency.
This paper raises important questions which are left for future research. An important ques-
tion is whether the change in the technical efficiency is something that was particular to this
increase in the capital requirements. Another question is the role of the capital exercise on
the profit and cost efficiency of the banks. As the stricter capital requirements reduces the
likelihood of financial distress but, the profits may decline. Further research is required on
the role of the post-crisis capital and liquidity requirement on the technical efficiency of the
banks.
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